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A December 2015 court decision by the Intellectual Property Court (IPC)
of the Russian Federation, affirmed by the Russian Supreme Court on May
26, 2016, has introduced significant legal uncertainty for innovative drug
developers in the Russian Federation.' In Novartis AG v. Biolntegrator, the
IPC limited the scope of regulatory protection for investigative data filed in
support of an application for marketing approval of a new drug, holding that
such protection is limited to undisclosed data, and does not include data that
was filed by the developer in support of its application and published in
medical journals.2 The IPC holding significantly curtailed the ability of
drug developers to prohibit the manufacturers of a generic or biosimilar
copy of the innovative drug from using their data to support its own
competing application. In October 2016, the Russian Ministry of Health
proposed amendments to the Law on Circulation of Medicines that would
codify the ruling,3 and in January 2018, the Government of the Russian
Federation released a comprehensive "Roadmap for Competition in
Healthcare" that will accelerate such initiatives.4
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Washington, D.C. 20007, tel. (202) 263-4362, bmcdonald@sgrlaw.com. The authors of this
Article received partial research funding from the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America, which represents the innovative biopharmaceutical industry. The views expressed
in this Article are solely those of the authors.
** Partner, Gowling WLG, 11 Gogolevsky Boulevard, Moscow, 119019 Russia, tel. +7 495
787 2073, vladislav.ugryumov@gowlingwlg.com.
*** Associate, Gowling WLG, 11 Gogolevsky Boulevard, Moscow, 119019 Russia, tel. + 7 495
787 2073.
1. See Lisa L. Mueller, Current State of Data Protection and Exclusivity in Russia, THE
NATIONAL LAw REVIEW (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/current-state-

data-protection-and-exclusivity-russia.

2. Id.
3. Anna McDonald, Changes in the Regulatory Controlof the PharmaceuticalMarket - Q1 2016
Review, LEXOLOGY (May 11, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=809cb41f401c-4e26-912a-835ba6540ed8.
4. Government of the Russian Federation, Roadmap for Development of Competition in
Healthcare,January 12, 2018, No. 9-r, http://static.government.ru/media/files/vyoWQD6EZY
QkBaqKfKFKAPZqqgtmcHDH.pdf (last accessed 02/14/2018).
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This Article examines the statutory protection of data submitted by drug
developers to obtain regulatory approval in the United States and the
European Union, the protection afforded under the Agreement of the
World Trade Organization on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS),5 and explains why the Novartis decision is in conflict with
TRIPS and damaging to the prospects of innovation in the Russian
pharmaceutical market.
I. Vulnerability of Innovative Drug Developers to Curtailment
of the Patent Term
All of the developed countries and most of the developing countries in the
world regulate the approval and registration of pharmaceutical products and
have statutory requirements to ensure the quality, safety, and effectiveness of
medicines.6 Of these, the majority provide innovative drug developers with
a statutory period of exclusive rights to the use of the data that they submit
to the government in support of such registration.:
The reason for protecting such data for a limited period of time is that the
development of innovative medicines is exceptionally lengthy, expensive, and
risky.8 A developer seeking approval of a new drug must begin with an
investigational new drug application,9 including detailed data and reports of
all animal and non-clinical testing performed on the drug.1o Physicians,
pharmacologists, chemists, microbiologists, and statisticians must review all
laboratory testing, including pharmacology and toxicology reports." Only
after the government has seen and approved these reports can clinical trials

&

5. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299.
6. See generally Litovkina, Rezhim eksklyuzivnosti issledovatel'nikh dannikh: mezhdunarodnyi opit i
rosiiskoe zakonodatel'stvo [Modes of Exclusivity for Research Data: International Experience and
Russian Law] 4 MEDITZINSKOE PRAvo (2011) (Russ.).
7. International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations, Data
Exclusivity: Encouraging Development of New Medicines (2011), https://www.ifpma.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/IFPMA_2011_DataExclusivityEnWeb.pdf.
8. See Henry Grabowski et al., Updated Trends in U.S. Brand-Name and Generic Drug
Competition, 19 J. MED. ECON. 836 (2016).
9. The FDA's Drug Review Process: EnsuringDrugs Are Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucml43534.htm
(last
visited Nov. 6, 2014).
10. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2016); InvestigationalNew Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevel
opedandapproved/approvalapplications/investigationalnewdrugindapplication/default.htm
(last
visited Oct. 5, 2017).

11. 21 U.S.C.
R41983,
(2012).

How

§ 355(n)(3)(b); 21 C.F.R. § 56.107;
FDA

SuSAN

THAUL,

CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,

APPROVEs DRUGS AND REGULATES THEIR SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENEss
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begin on humans.12 Even passing this part of the approval process is
extremely difficult, and it is estimated that "for every five thousand active
pharmaceutical ingredients screened in the United States, only five will
proceed to clinical testing, and only one will eventually be approved."1
After trials on humans begin, the time and costs of drug development
escalate.'4 Clinical testing goes through multiple phases, each taking several
years. 5 Each phase involves an increased number of human subjects, and
only after all phases are completed can a new drug application be submitted
to the government for final review.16 The final review process can take
another several years, and the approval of new drugs is often denied at this
stage.1 7 Even when approval is granted, the developer's costs continue, as
information about safety and efficacy is inevitably incomplete, and some
adverse reactions are discovered only after a drug has been marketed for
years.' 8 Drug manufacturers must report all instances of adverse drug
reactions regardless of whether the physician, the manufacturer, or others
believe the reaction to be drug-related.19 The government retains the ability
to revoke approval upon new evidence of risks, to request changes in
labeling, and to issue a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy "all in the
interest of consumer safety."20 Innovative drug developers, thus, have
substantial regulatory costs even after approval.21
The regulatory approval process for innovative drugs in the United States
is summarized in Table 1.

12. Veronica S. Jae, Comment, Simplifying FDASIA: The "Fast Track" to Expedited Drug
ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 176 - 77 (2014).

Approval Efficiency, 66

13. Id. at 178.
14. Id. at 178-79.
15. Id.; see also FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 5.
16. Jae, supra note 8, at 178; FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 5.
17. David S. Torborg, Comment, Design Defect Liability and Prescription Drugs: Who's in
Charge?, 59 Omo ST. L. J. 633, 662. (1998).
18. Bruce N. Kuhlik & Richard F. Kingham, The Adverse Effects of Standardless Punitive
Damage Awards on PharmaceuticalDevelopment and Availability, 45 FoOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 693,

696 (1990).
19. 21 C.F.R. § 312.80(a), (c) (2015) (explaining that applicants must report an "adverse drug
experience," and that an adverse drug experience is "[a]ny adverse event ...
whether or not
considered drug related.").
20. Jae, supra note 8, at 179.
21. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 255(e), (o)(3)(A) (2016)); SusAN THAUL, How FDA APPROVES
DRUGS AND REGULATES THEIR SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS 8 (2012).
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New Drug Development Process
Phase

Description

Preclinical
Investigations

Laboratory analysis; animal testing

Clinical
Evaluation
Phase 1

Human trials beginning with examination of pharmacologic
actions and safe dosage range; how the drug is absorbed,
distributed, metabolized, and excreted; and its duration of
action

Clinical
Evaluation
Phase 2

Controlled studies in volunteers to assess the effectiveness
of a drug. Simultaneous animal and human studies can
continue to examine further the safety of the drug.

Clinical
Evaluation
Phase 3

Testing using a greater number of volunteer patients. The
drug is administered by practicing physicians to those
suffering from the condition the drug is intended to treat.
These studies must confirm earlier efficacy studies and
determine low-incidence adverse reactions.

Clinical
Evaluation
Phase 4

Studies conducted after approval by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), during general use of the drug by
medical practitioners. Also referred to as post-marketing
studies.

In light of these requirements, the average time between the first identification of a new chemical compound and the marketing of the final product is
ten to fifteen years, 23 and the average period of protection for an innovative
drug following the receipt of marketing approval is only twelve to thirteen
years. 24 As a result, the twenty-year patent term provided by international
treaty is insufficient to recoup the investment in development without a stat22. See generally Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 2, 1 JACC:
TRANSLATIONAL

SCIENCE

BASIC TO

277 (2016).

23. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Drug Discovery and Development:
Understandingthe R&D Process (2007), http://cmidd.northwestern.edu/files/2015/10/DrugRD
Brochure-12e7vs6.pdf; Henry Grabowski, Follow-On Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance
Between Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REvs. DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 481 (2008).
24. See Henry Grabowski et al., Visited Trends in U.S. Brand-Name and Generic Drug Competition, 19 J. MED. ECON. 836 (2016). For drugs experiencing initial generic entry in 2013 - 2014,
the average market exclusivity period was 12.5 years for drugs involving new molecular entities
with sales greater than $250 million (in 2008 dollars) in the year prior to generic entry, and 13.6
years overall. See id. See also Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in
Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 116 (2000); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J.
Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-DesignedApproach for the Modern Era?, 15
YALE J. OF HEALTH POL'Y, L., AND ETHICS, 293, 308 (2015), http://digitalcommons.law.yale
.edu/yjhple/voll 5/iss2/2.
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utory extension of the patent term to account for a portion of the time consumed in the regulatory approval process.
The need for regulatory data protection has increased over the last decade
with surging investment in pharmaceutical research and development. By
2003, the cost to develop and win marketing approval for a new drug was
$802 million.25 By 2014, that number reached an astonishing $2.6 billion,
including marketing, capital costs, research and development, and recovery
of losses from unsuccessful drugs.26

II.

Expedited Approval of Generics and Biosimilars

Many countries, including Russia and the United States, have expedited
registration procedures to avoid the duplication of efforts by the producer of
a generic or biosimilar drug containing the same active ingredient as the
originally registered "reference" drug.27 To obtain approval for the
marketing of a generic or biosimilar drug, it is unnecessary to submit the
results of preclinical investigations and clinical testing as a means of
demonstrating its efficacy and safety, and it is sufficient, instead, to rely on
data establishing the pharmacology of the drug and its "bioequivalence" to
the original or "reference" drug.28
The cost of obtaining marketing approval for a generic drug can be a
thousand times less than the cost incurred by the developer of the reference
drug. In contrast to the average $2.6 billion investment in research,
development, and regulatory approval of the innovative drug, the generic
copy of the drug can be manufactured with an investment of only two to
three million dollars in reverse engineering and marketing approval.29
25. See Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420 (2006), http://content.healthaffairs.org/
content/25/2/420.long; Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH EcON. 151, 180 (2003).
26. Jerry Avorn, The $2.6 Billion Pill Methodologic and Poliy Considerations, 372 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1877, 1878 (2015); Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the PharmaceuticalIndustry: New
Estimates ofR&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 27 (2016) (estimating that pre-approval R&D
costs average $2.6 billion per drug); Cost to Develop and Win MarketingApprovalfor a New Drug
is $2.6 Billion, TUFTS CTR. FOR STUDY OF DRUG DEV. (Nov. 18, 2014), http://csdd.tufts.edu/
news/completestory/prtufts-csdd_2014_cost-study.
27. In the United States, a generic drug manufacturer can obtain expedited approval by
showing "bioequivalence" to a reference-listed drug that has already been approved by the
FDA, that is, that the generic drug contains the same active ingredients, employs the same route
of administration, presents the same dosage form, and exhibits the same strength as its brand
name counterpart. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i) - (iii) (2016). The generic drug
must be identical to its branded equivalent in "active ingredients, safety, and efficacy." PLIVA,
Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 612 n.1 (2011). A generic drug application must also show that
"the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the listed
drug." § 355(j)(2)(A)(v).
28. See generally § 355(j)(2)(A)(i) - (iii), (v).
29. Adi Gillat, Compulsory Licensing to Regulated Licensing: Effects on the Conflict Between
Innovation and Access in the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 58 FOOD DRUG L. J. 711, 725 (2003).
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Consequently, producers of generics can push the original drug developer
out of the market within several months following expiration of the patent. 30
An investigation of six drugs for which the period of exclusivity expired
between 2009-2013 demonstrated that, within three months of such
expiration, generics occupied 60 percent of the respective markets.3'
The expedited registration of generic and biosimilar drugs is statutorily
permitted only after a temporary period of regulatory data protection or
"data exclusivity," i.e., the period of time during which the developer of the
original drug has the exclusive right to commercial use of the data from his
own investigations that he filed in his application for regulatory marketing
approval.32
Regulatory data protection provides the incentive for innovative drug
researchers and developers to invest in the cost of preclinical investigations,
clinical trials, and the production of data necessary for regulatory approval.33
In the absence of government intervention in the form of data and
marketing exclusivity, generic drug producers would be able to immediately
reap the rewards of the investigations conducted by innovative drug
developers. By "referencing" the data from innovative drug investigations
without incurring expenses of producing that data, generic drug producers
can offer a lower price and will push the innovative drug developer out of
the market without a period of data exclusivity.
Regulatory data protection, as such, is not a privilege accorded to drug
developers, but a period of time during which the regulatory barriers to the
marketing of all drugs are borne equally by all applicants.34 During the
period of data exclusivity, each applicant is required to prove, prior to
marketing a molecular compound or its equivalent, that the compound is
safe and effective based on a full array of preclinical investigations and
clinical trials that have been conducted, financed, or acquired by that
applicant.35 Data exclusivity is required in order to eliminate the loss of
market share by equalizing the position of the first comer and all subsequent
applicants for registration of a drug.36 Data exclusivity works to the benefit
not only of the innovative drug developer, but also of generic drug
manufacturers, who gain the opportunity for an expedited procedure to
30. Id. at 717.
31. Murray L. Aitken et al., The Regulation of Prescription Drug Competition and Market
Responses: Patterns in Prices and Sales Following Loss of Exclusivity 1 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ.

Research, Working Paper No. 19487, 2013).
32. See, e.g., European Generic Medicines Ass'n., Making Medicines Affordable, (2010), http://

www.wipo.int/mwg-internal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=GRid3nCaOhBjBkFPDuztOpj2_ObP
goEYT6ilmjqSkBY.
33. Reducing Data ProtectionForBiologics Would Slow Medical ProgressAnd Chill R&D Investment
In The U.S., PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA (Oct. 2015)
https://www.phrma.org/fact-sheet/data-exclusivity-for-biologics.

34. Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20
3 5. Id.
36. Id. at 107.

LEWIS

& CLARK L. REV. 91, 110 (2016).
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register their bioequivalent and biosimilar drugs following the period of
exclusivity.
III.

Data Exclusivity vs. Marketing Exclusivity

Data exclusivity is to be distinguished from the exclusive right to market a
particular drug, or "marketing exclusivity." Data exclusivity refers to the
period during which the regulatory authority may not examine a subsequent
application for approval of a new drug using data from the developer's
original application.37 Data exclusivity does not prevent other applicants
from preparing their own data to support a marketing application.38
Marketing exclusivity refers to an additional period during which an
application for approval of the generic product may be filed and examined,
but not approved.39 Both forms of exclusivity are distinct from the exclusive
rights to a patent, which require the patent holder to independently identify
and pursue infringers.
IV.

Patent Protection Distinguished

'

In some cases, the period of data exclusivity coincides with the period of
exclusive patent rights.40 But, regulatory data protection is a critical
supplement, not a substitute, for patent protection. Regulatory data
protection augments patent protection on innovative medicines by providing
temporary protection for the comprehensive package of information that
biopharmaceutical innovators must submit to regulatory authorities to
demonstrate the safety and efficacy of a medicine for marketing approval,
providing critical incentives for investment in new treatments and cures.4
Regulatory data protection and patent protection are conceptually
different. Whereas a patent affords its holder a legal right to exclude others
from use of the invention claimed in the patent for a fixed period (normally
twenty years), data exclusivity temporarily prohibits competitors of the
innovative drug developer from relying on the test and other data submitted
by the innovator to secure marketing approval.42 As such, producers of
generics and biosimilars are not prohibited from undertaking the procedure
37. Prihodko, Pravovoy rezhim zashchity dannykh o rezul'tatakh doklinicheskikh i klinicheskikh
issledovaniy lekarstvennykh sredstv v SSHA i YES [Legal Regime for the Protection of Data on the
Results of Preclinicaland Clinical Studies of Drugs in the US and the EU], SEKTORY PRAVA (Oct. 11,
2016), http://xn -7sbbaj7auwnffhk.xn-plai/article/21448
(Russ.).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Alexey Zalesov, Novatory nuzhdayutsya v zashchite [Innovators Need Protection], ROSSlYSKAYA
GAZETA (Feb. 25, 2016), https://rg.ru/2016/02/25/otsutstvie-patentov-v-farmacevtike-zatormo
zilo-by-ee-razvitie.html (Russ.).
41. Lisa Diependaele et al., Raising the Barriers to Access to Medicines in the Developing
World-The Relentless Push for Data Exclusivity, 17 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICs 11, 12
(2017).
42. Id.
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for registration of their drugs, provided that they submit the results of their
own investigations, even though it is ordinarily unfeasible to do so because
of the time and expense.43
Patent protection and data exclusivity serve different aims. While patents
are necessary to stimulate innovations that meet the criteria of patentability
in terms of novelty, inventive step, and industrial application, the primary
purpose of data exclusivity is to stimulate the development of innovative
drugs for which the active ingredients and compounds have not been
previously approved by the government and to invest in investigations that
confirm the safety of drugs for use in humans and their effectiveness for the
cure of disease.44
The data necessary to obtain a pharmaceutical patent is also different from
that necessary for marketing approval.45 There is substantially no
correspondence between the documents and information necessary for
marketing approval and that necessary to establish patentability. The
purpose of data exclusivity is to stimulate the investigation and production of
such additional data as is required for marketing approval but unrelated to
obtaining a patent. 46
Moreover, in instances where a drug is not patentable, data exclusivity is
the only means by which the drug developer can recoup its investment.47
Many drugs are un-patentable because of the inability to comply with formal
requirements, for example, where a prior publication is disclosed that defeats
the novelty of the invention. In those instances, only data exclusivity can
provide the incentive to market the drug. For example, if the anticancer
drug Taxol (paclitaxel) were not protected by data exclusivity, then the
developer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, would be unable to recoup its investment
in its development, valued at more than $500 million, and would have no
incentive to market the drug.48
Considering that the first sale of a drug occurs only ten to fifteen years
after the beginning of the patent term, the remaining term of the patent is
ordinarily not sufficient for the developer to recoup his investment in
development of the drug. Whereas the average period on the market for an
innovative drug before generic entry is only 12.5 years from the moment of
first sale, even accounting for an extension of the patent term, 49 the time
necessary to recoup an investment in a biologic drug is even longer,
43. Id.
44. Id. at 16-17.
45. See Gargi Chakrabarti, Need of Data Exclusivity: Impact on Access to Medicine, 19 J. OF
INTELL. PROP. RTs. 325, 329 (2014).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 332-333.
48. Id. at 333. Erica Lietzan offers numerous examples where the preparation was protected
under the data exclusivity regime in the absence of patents. See Erika Lietzan, The Myths of
Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 91, 110 (2016).
49. See Henry Grabowski et al., Visited Trends in U.S. Brand-Name and Generic Drug
Competition, 19 J. MED. ECON. 836 (2016).
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averaging from 12.9 to 16.2 years.o In such situations, data exclusivity
serves as an essential addition to the patent term, and only by means of
patent protection and data exclusivity collectively can developers be afforded
the opportunity to recoup their investment in the development,
investigation, and marketing of innovative drugs.
V.

Regulatory Data Protection in the United States

Until 1984, generic companies in the United States were required to
generate their own test data for marketing approval, and pharmaceutical
patent holders could treat their own undisclosed clinical trial and other data
that they submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as trade
secrets. 51 The FDA protected the confidentiality of such information and
prohibited generic manufacturers from "referencing" such data in order to
obtain marketing approval for therapeutically equivalent products.52 While
generic companies could have performed their own expensive, timeconsuming, and duplicative clinical trials, hardly any did so because of the
costs and delays, compounded by the ethical issues raised when clinical trials
are repeated on human subjects where the outcomes are already known.53
The Hatch-Waxman Act54 made it easier to obtain FDA approval of
generic drugs by "strik[ing] a balance between 'two conflicting policy
objectives: to induce name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the
investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, while
simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of
those drugs to market.'"55

The Hatch-Waxman Act was adopted to allow for faster introduction of
generic competition in exchange for:
* limited but strictly enforced periods of regulatory data protection;
* increased rights of drug developers to restore patent terms that were
shortened by clinical trials and the regulatory approval process
(patent term extension); and
* a linkage system conditioning registration of generic equivalents to
the absence of valid patent claims.56

&

50. Henry Grabowski et al., Data Exclusivity for Biologics, 10 NATURE REvs DRUG DISCOVERY
15, 15 (2011).
51. Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/
Registration Linkage, 34 Am. J. L. & MED. 303, 305 (2008).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act),
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2017)).
55. aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Abbott Labs. v.
Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J. dissenting on other grounds)).
56. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MicH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REv. 345, 357 - 58 (2007). In Russia, there is no patent linkage; in contrast to the
United States and other developed countries, innovative drug developers in Russia are not
notified of marketing approval applications filed for potentially infringing products and are
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Generic companies in the United States gained from the Hatch-Waxman
Act because they can now seek regulatory approval for bioequivalent drugs
through an abbreviated new drug application procedure that no longer
requires the duplication of investigative data and clinical trials57 If the
generic producer can show that the generic drug has the same active
ingredients and is "bioequivalent" to the original innovative drug and that
the generic is manufactured according to Good Manufacturing Practice
(GMP), then the generic receives regulatory approval under a quicker
process.58
In addition to relieving them from the cost of conducting duplicate
investigations and clinical trials, the Hatch-Waxman Act allowed generic
producers in the United States to file an application for regulatory approval
of a generic drug even during the patent term of the original drug under
certain conditions.59 In addition, the first generic entrant to successfully
challenge patent right claims and obtain approval is granted a six-month
period of marketing exclusivity against later filed generics.60
Innovative drug developers in the United States also gained from the
Hatch-Waxman Act, winning two kinds of data exclusivity in addition to the
seven-year orphan drug marketing exclusivity they obtained a year earlier.61
For innovative drugs not previously approved by the FDA, the registrant is
granted five years of data exclusivity prohibiting submission of a follow-on
application for regulatory approval of a generic equivalent, even if the
product is unpatented or off-patent.62 "The five-year bar against follow-on
applications is shortened to four years if the generic company is claiming
patent invalidity or non-infringement."63
A shorter period of three years was enacted by the Hatch-Waxman Act
whenever a new drug application is filed for a new indication for an existing
drug, a new formulation or delivery system, or a new combination, if the
application is accompanied by at least one new clinical investigation
necessary for approval.64 "However, unlike five-year data exclusivity, a
second applicant can seek tentative approval at the FDA during the period
of' three-year "exclusivity, even though final approval" is not "granted until
generally unable to secure provisional

enforcement measures. See PHARMACEUTICAL
301 SUBMISSION 2017 19 (2017),
http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/files/dmfile/PhRMA-2017-Special-301-Submission.pdf.
57. Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/
Registration Linkage, 34 Am. J. L. & MED. 303, 305 (2008).
58. Id. at 305-06.
59. Id. at 306.
60. Id.
61. Id. An orphan drug is a pharmaceutical agent that has been developed specifically to treat
a rare medical condition, the condition itself being referred to as an orphan disease. See Orphan
Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2017).
62. Baker, supra note 35, at 306.
63. Id.
64. Id.
RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, SPECIAL
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the three-year term has elapsed."65 Moreover, the new exclusivity only
attaches to the change and does not alter the exclusivity period of the
original product.66

Fundamental to the protection of patents in the Hatch-Waxman Act was a
new form of "patent linkage" involving the creation of a reference list of
patented pharmaceuticals called the "Orange Book."67 Under this system,
the producers of registered drugs record their patent claims in the FDA's
Orange Book at such time as the drugs received marketing approval.68 If a
generic producer subsequently files an application for approval of the
generic equivalent, the producer has to certify for each patent: (1) that there
are no conflicting patents; (2) that any relevant patents have expired; (3) that
registration of the new generic would not become final until expiration of
the relevant patents; or (4) that the patent is invalid or would not be
infringed.69 In the event of invalidity or non-infringement claims, the patent
holder is notified and given the opportunity to bring a patent infringement
action. 70 If the suit is filed within forty-five days of the notice, it triggers a
thirty-month stay.]'
As a result of Hatch-Waxman, "the percentage of prescription drugs filled
by generics soared from 19 percent in 1984 to 74 percent in 2009," and
"[t]oday generics account for 91 percent of all prescriptions filled in the
United States."72
Regulatory data protection (RDP) "is particularly critical for biologic
medicines, which may not be adequately protected by patents alone."73

Made from living organisms, "biologics are so complex that it is possible for
others to produce a version-or 'biosimilar'-of a medicine that may not be
covered within the scope of the innovator's patent."74 The Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 created a pathway for approval of
biosimilars, but in turn, determined that the appropriate data protection
term for biologics is a period of twelve years. 5 This number was based on
research demonstrating the need for incentives to ensure that
"biopharmaceutical innovators and the associated global scientific ecosystem
are able to sustainably pursue groundbreaking biomedical research."76
65. Id. at 306-307.
66. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act),

Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2017)).
67. Baker, supra note 35, at 307.

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

72. PharmaceuticalResearch and Manufacturers of America (Phrma), Special 301 Submission

2017 (Feb. 10, 2017) at 21, https://www.keionline.org/sites/default/files/PhRMA-2017-Special301-Submission.pdf.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2010).
76. Phrma, supra note 37, at 21.
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International Practice

Too many trading partners of the United States do not provide regulatory
data protection.77 "This is contrary to WATO rules, which require parties to
protect regulatory test data submitted as a condition of obtaining marketing
approval against both disclosure and unfair commercial use."78 Examples
include "Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Turkey
and Venezuela."79 "U.S. trade agreements generally require parties to
provide RDP for a specified period of time, but some partner countries have
not fully honored their commitments."so "For example, Mexico and Peru
provide RDP for small-molecule treatments, but not for biologics."1 In
Chile, protection is unavailable "for new uses, formulations, compositions[,]
or dosage forms."82 "Canada passed legislation in 2014 that gives the Health
Minister broad discretion to share undisclosed test data without safeguards
to protect against unfair commercial use."83
VII.

European Union

In 1987, the European Union established terms "of data exclusivity ...
longer than those" existing in the United States at that time.84 For
medicines approved by the European Medicines Agency, data exclusivity for
ten years was enacted, although Member States could enforce periods of
exclusivity from six to ten years for purposes of their internal domestic
registration procedures.s5
In 2005, the European Union amended its data exclusivity law in
Directive 2004/27/EC.86 The Directive introduced an 8+2+1 formula that
"grants absolute data exclusivity for eight years."87 During this period, the
generic producer can conduct testing and pre-registration activities, but it
can only apply for marketing approval following the expiration of eight
years.88 Although approval can be sought during the following two-year
window, the approval can only become effective upon the expiration of the
full ten years. 89 In addition to this uniform ten-year term of data exclusivity,
"there is an additional one-year extension for new therapeutic indications
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Phrma, supra note 37, at 22.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 21-22.
83. Id. at 22.
84. Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/
Registration Linkage, 34 Avi. J. L. & MED. 303, 307 (2008).
85. Id.
86. Council Directive 2004/27/EC; see Junod, Drug Exclusivity Under United States and
European Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 479, 510-14 (2004).
87. Baker, supra note 41, at 307.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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filed within the first eight years," if the drug "provides significant clinical
benefits compared to existing therapies."90
In summary, data exclusivity has been recognized in all developed
countries as an essential incentive to the development of innovative drugs.
By means of data exclusivity, drugs that are proven safe, effective, and of
good quality are entitled to exclusive marketing rights from the moment of
regulatory approval.91 In reliance on these rights, innovative drug
developers "can choose the timing and sequence of market approvals" with
confidence that their exclusive rights will not be affected.92 "Data exclusivity
is not subject to patent-style novelty requirements and is not lost, in most
countries, simply because of delays in seeking regulatory approval for the
marketing of a new medicine."93
VIII.

Developed Countries vs. Developing Countries

To protect their populations from the health consequences of poor-quality
medicines, "all developed countries and most developing countries have"
enacted "quality, safety, and efficacy standards that require prior regulatory
approval before a medicine can be distributed within domestic markets."94
Notwithstanding, most developing countries have a severely limited ability
to process drug approval applications.95 "Although some countries
cooperate in regional registration agreements, 96 and others rely on proof of
foreign registration"97 or pre-qualification by the World Health
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 308; Council Directive 2004/27, supra note 43, at art. 10.1, T 4.
Baker, supra note 41, at 308.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 309; see Effective Drug Regulation: What Can Countries Do?, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION 13 (1999), www.who.int/medicinedocs/collect/medicinedocs/pdf/s2216e/s2216
e.pdf. "Another fifty percent have varying degrees of regulatory" authority, although few "can
undertake start-to-finish assessment of new product dossiers." Baker, supra note 41, at n.37.
The remaining one-third has very limited pharmaceutical registration capacity or none
whatsoever. Id.
96. Baker, supra note 41, at 309; see Sisule F. Musungu, et al., Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilitiesfor
Public Health Protection Through South-South Regional Frameworks, SOUTH CENTRE 65-68
(2004), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4968e/s4968e.pdf. "There have been regional,
sub-regional, and other harmonization efforts by the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), the Pharmaceutical Product evaluation Group of the Association of
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Cooperation Council for the Arab States," the Pan
American Health Organization, the "Latin American Association for Integration, and the
Andean Community. European harmonization is the most advanced, though there are still
ongoing efforts especially concerning Accession States." Baker, supra note 41, at n.38. There
has also been an attempt to "harmonize standards globally through the International
Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals
for Human Use," led by the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Id.
97. See Rossi, Free Trade Agreements and TRIPS-Plus Measures, 1 INT'L INTELL. PROP. MGMT.
150, 156 (2006).
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Organization,98 many countries, including Russia, "still require submission
of safety" and efficacy data as a condition to domestic registration."99
Some developing countries have struggled to minimize the enactment of
data exclusivity requirements. From their perspective, the international and
domestic infrastructure for registering medicines is already exceptionally
complicated and plagued with inefficiencies, delay,100 and corruption.11
Registration-related difficulties arise from discrepancies between economic
incentives for innovator and generic producers, and because of regulatory
inefficiency and unaccountability at the national and international level.102
Registration-related barriers affecting generic manufacturers in developing
countries include:
*

a "lack of sufficient incentive[s] .

. . ,

technical assistance," and other

measures enabling "generic companies to promptly register their
therapeutic equivalents";
* the "absence of fast-track registration procedures . . . to expedite
registration of medicines that have been accepted by the VVHO
Prequalification Project or registered by a .

.

. regulatory authority

in another country";
* an "absence of efficient special authorization procedures" for
"emergency access to important medicines while the formal
registration process is .

*

.

. completed"; and

a "lack of capacity, inefficiency, high costs, regulatory variations,
and occasional corruption in national drug regulatory authorities
that create delays and disincentives to both innovators and
producers of generic equivalents."103

These registration-related barriers characterize the poorest and least
developed countries more than they do the Russian Federation, where
generic manufacturers are already incentivized to promptly register their
therapeutic equivalents by the availability of a fast-track registration
procedure.o4 To that extent, the danger to the Russian pharmaceutical
industry inheres in the insufficient protection of data exclusivity, not
excessive protection.
98. Id.; see Prequalification of Medicines by WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WWW
.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs278/en (last visited Jan. 2013).
99. Baker, supra note 41, at 309-3 10.
100. Id. at 310; see The World Medicines Situation, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 93-94
(2004), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/collect/medicinedocs/pdf/s6160e/s6160e.pdf.
101. Baker, supra note 41, at 310; see MEASURING Transparencyin Medicines Registration, Selection
and Procurement: Four Country Assessment Studies, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 1 (2006),
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/goodgovernance/Transparency4CountryStudy.pdf.
"The combination of inefficiency, incapacity, and corruption has resulted in a" high incidence
of "substandard and counterfeit drugs ...
in developing countries." Baker, supra note 41, at
n.42.
102. Id. at 310.
103. Id. at 311.
104. Id. at n.36.
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TRIPS

The United States and other developed economies sought the
introduction of minimal standards of data exclusivity in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS).105 Specifically, Article 39.3 of TRIPS provides:
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the
origination of which involves considerable effort, shall protect such data
against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such
data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or
unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against
unfair commercial use. 06
Pursuant to Article 39.3, member states incur two obligations under
TRIPS: (a) to protect data relating to drug investigations acquired at
considerable effort from unfair commercial use; and (b) to protect the
confidentiality of such information.107 This language must be interpreted
consistent with the objectives and aims of the TRIPS Agreement in order to
ensure the necessary protection of data exclusivity in the member states. 08
Article 39.3 of TRIPS does not expressly state whether it extends only to
governmental regulatory authorities or also to nongovernmental
organizations responsible for the registration of pharmaceutical products.109
It stands to reason, however, that Article 39.3 must apply to
nongovernmental organizations as well, otherwise it could be circumvented
by outsourcing the administration of pharmaceutical product approval.io
Moreover, the legislation of several member states allows for the registration
of a drug in the domestic market based on the results of examination
conducted in a different state (or group of states)."' In cases where
government A relies on the results of previous examination by government
105. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex IC, art. 8(1),
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81, available at www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf
(Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization) (the "TRIPS Agreement").
106. Id. at art. 39.3.
107. Id.
108. In agreement with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), an
agreement must be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with ordinary meaning, which
should be imparted to terms of the agreement in their context, and in light of the objects and
aims of the agreement. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
109. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 53, at art. 39.3.
110. Id.
111. G. Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data Required by
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 24 - 25 (2003).
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B, government A has an obligation to protect the registration data submitted
to government B, which acts in the capacity as an agent of government A.112
For example, Article 39.3 extends regulatory data protection to
pharmaceutical products containing "new chemical entities," but does not
indicate in which sense the drafters intended the word "new" to function in
this clause, i.e., whether the word refers to patentable novelty."1 But, the
word "new" must be understood as a reference to chemical substances that
have not already been approved by the government because interpreting the
word "new" as a reference to patentable novelty would contradict the aim of
Article 39.3, inasmuch as the standards of protection for undisclosed
information appear in Section 7 of TRIPS, apart from the treatment of
patent rights in Section 5.114 Consequently, "new" for purposes of Article
39.3 of TRIPS can only mean a chemical compound that previously was not
registered in that WTO member state, regardless of its patentability."s
It is further unclear from the language of Article 39.3 whether the
provision extends only to "undisclosed" data, that is, data not publicly
accessible.116 According to Article 39.3, the protection extends not only to
"undisclosed" data but also to other information the acquisition "of which
involves a considerable effort.""o But, in the pharmaceutical industry, the
results of drug investigations are universally published, and such information
is routinely used for the registration of new pharmaceutical products as well
as the expedited approval of generic equivalents and biosimilars.iis Ethical
requirements requiring the publication of clinical investigation results are
also established in Paragraph 36 of the Helsinki Declaration of World
Medical Association of 1964.119 Additionally, the label instructions of
112. Id. at 25.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 26.
115. Id.
116. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 39.3, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf.

117. Id.
118. See Skillington, supra note 54, at 24-30.
119. World Medical Association [WMA], WMA Declaration of Helsinki-Ethical Principles
for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, at T 36 (June 1964), http://irb.sinica.edu.tw/

doc/regulation/DECLARATION%200F%20HELSINKI%20(2013).pdf

[hereinafter

the

Helsinki Declaration]. As stated in the Helsinki Declaration, "Researchers, authors, sponsors,
editors and publishers all have ethical obligations with regard to the publication and
dissemination of the results of research. Researchers have a duty to make publicly available the
results of their research on human subjects and are accountable for the completeness and
accuracy of their reports. All parties should adhere to accepted guidelines for ethical reporting.
Negative and inconclusive as well as positive results must be published or otherwise made
publicly available. Sources of funding, institutional affiliations and conflicts of interest must be
declared in the publication. Reports of research not in accordance with the principles of this
Declaration should not be accepted for publication." Id.
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pharmaceutical products are required to include information about the
results of investigations involving the product.120
The protection of regulatory data pursuant to Article 39.3, therefore,
would lose all meaning, and would suffer from an internal contradiction, if
regulatory data protection terminated every time part of the information
became publicly accessible. Article 39.3 is intended to create an incentive
for developers to offer safe and effective pharmaceutical products in the
maximum possible number of markets.121 If protection were afforded only to
undisclosed results, then, after registration of the product in the first
members state where protection was sought and publication of the
investigative data in that country, the developer would lose the possibility to
obtain protection of its data in all other member states, and consequently
would lose the incentive to offer pharmaceutical products in the markets of
those countries.122

Moreover, if data exclusivity terminated every time information became
publicly accessible, developers would be vulnerable to unfair commercial
practices by competitors, who could publish investigative data obtained, for
example, through industrial espionage, or violation of a confidentiality
agreement, for the purpose of depriving the developer of the opportunity to
avail itself of regulatory data protection. Developers would lose the
incentive to conduct investigations if they knew that any event resulting in
the disclosure of the data would cut short the period of exclusivity.
Similarly, to qualify for protection under Article 39.3 of TRIPS, the
acquisition of data must "involve considerable effort."123 But, the effort need
not have been expended in the country where subsequent registration is
sought if it was expended in the country where registration was originally
approved.124
Thus, the development and marketing of any new
pharmaceutical product requires "considerable effort" in terms of the
financial and time commitments required to conduct preclinical
investigations and clinical trials.
In cases where "considerable effort" is established, VVTO member states
must protect such data from "unfair commercial use." Interpreting that
phrase in context as required by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the
120. Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Circulations of Medicine, art. 27, 2010, No. 61FZ.
121. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 55, at art. 39.3.
122. Id. The strategy of the developer in that instance would lie in the introduction of the
product in markets with the highest-income consumers and the longest period of data
exclusivity, that is, in the European Union and the United States, but not in the marketing of
developing countries. See id. That is because, if Article 39.3 is interpreted in such a way that
any publication of undisclosed data in country A bars data exclusivity in country B, then
innovative drug developers will always choose an EU country or the United States, where they
would obtain data exclusivity first, inasmuch as the period of protection is longer there, instead
of registering their drugs in Russia where the period of protection is shorter. See id.
123. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 55, at art 39.3.
124. G. Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data Required by
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 28-29 (2003).
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unauthorized use of data from prior preclinical investigations and clinical
trials to support an application for registration of a generic equivalent prior
to expiration of the data exclusivity meets both criteria, i.e., it is both unfair
and a commercial use.1 25
The term "unfair" in Article 39.3 of TRIPS must likewise be interpreted
in the context of the "considerable efforts" by the developer to obtain the
data.126 In this context, producers of generics are "free riders"127 ViS-a-ViS
innovative drug developers inasmuch as they exploit the results of research
and investigation in which they did not invest.128 Moreover, due to the
expense of preclinical investigations and clinical trials, producers of generics
are advantageously situated from the very beginning in comparison to the
developers because they can offer lower prices for their products.129 And the
use of such data by the generic manufacturer has an unquestionably
commercial character inasmuch as it is directed at the marketing and sale of
the manufacturer's own product and corresponding profit.
The TRIPS Agreement does not provide for a universal period of data
exclusivity.130 The average period of protection in the member states is
between five and twelve years.131 As noted above, the countries of the
European Union recognize a ten-year period of exclusivity; in Canada, data
is protected for eight years; in Russia and China, the period of exclusivity is
six years; and it is five years in Egypt, Chile, New Zealand, Malaysia,
Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Jordan, Oman, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam.132
In some of these countries, however, meaningful regulatory data protection
exists on paper but not in practice.
X.

Russian Legislation

Russia became a member of the WTO on August 22, 2012, taking on the
obligation to bring its national legislation into conformance with the
125. Id. at 28; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
126. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 55, at art 39.3.
127. The term "free-rider" (bezbiletnik in Russian) is a party who received benefit from the
efforts undertaken by another party without paying for them. See Jennifer E. Sturiale, HatchWaxman PatentLitigation and Inter Partes Review: A New Sort of Competition, 69 ALA. L. REv. 59,
72-73 (2017) (discussing free rider problem).
128. Skillington, supra note 59, at 30.
129. Id. at 8.
130. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 55. An earlier draft of TRIPS provided for a five-year
minimum period for exclusivity of data, which was deleted from the final version of the
Agreement. See Gargi Chakrabarti, Need of Data Exclusivity: Impact on Access to Medicine, 19 J. OF
INTELL. PROP. RTs. 325, 333 (2014).
131. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Global Intellectual Property Center, Heading in a Different
Direction? The European Medicine Agency's Policy on the Public Release of Clinical Trials Data, (2014)
at 11-12, http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2 014/05/EMA-StudyCOMPLETE.pdf.
132. Id.
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requirements of TRIPS.33 As stated in the Report of the Working Group
on Accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO:
The representative of the Russian Federation confirmed that the
Russian Federation had enacted legislation and would adopt regulations
on the protection of undisclosed information and test data, in
compliance with Article 39.3 of the WTO TRIPS Agreement,
providing that undisclosed information submitted to obtain marketing
approval, i.e., registration of pharmaceutical products, would provide
for a period of at least six years of protection against unfair commercial
use starting from the date of grant of marketing approval in the Russian
Federation. During this period of protection against unfair commercial
use, no person or entity (public or private), other than the person or
entity who submitted such undisclosed data, could without the explicit
consent of the person or entity who submitted such undisclosed data
rely, directly or indirectly, on such data in support of an application for
product approval/registration. Notice of subsequent applications for
registration would be provided in accord with established procedures.
During the six year period, any subsequent application for marketing
approval or registration would not be granted, unless the subsequent
applicant submitted his own data (or data used with the authorization of
the right-holder) meeting the same requirements as the first applicant,
and products registered without submission of such data would be
removed from the market until requirements were met. Further, he
confirmed that the Russian Federation would protect such data against
any disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public or unless
steps were taken to ensure that the data were protected against unfair
commercial use.1 34
In its 2012 Report to the WTO, the Russian Federation confirmed that it
would provide protection against the disclosure and unfair commercial use
of undisclosed data and investigative results submitted in support of an
application for approval of new drugs for a period of six years. 35 The
representative of the Russian Federation specifically pointed out that during
this period of exclusivity applicants for approval of generic and biosimilar
pharmaceutical products must submit the same information about the results
of clinical investigations establishing safety and effectiveness that was
required of the first party who filed an application for such registration, and
that products submitted for registration without the filing of such data will
be prohibited from the market.136
133. Russian Federation, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/acc e/al russie e.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
134. Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, Report of The Working Party on
The Accession of The Russian Federationto the World Trade Organization,T 1295, WTO Doc. WT/
ACC/RUS/70 (Nov. 17, 2011).
135. Id. T 1295-96.
136. Id. T 1296.
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In order to conform its domestic legislation to Article 39.3 of TRIPS,
Federal Law No. FZ-61, "On the Circulation of Medicines," was enacted on
October 11, 2010.137 Article 18.6 of the 2010 law prohibited the
unauthorized receipt, disclosure, commercial use, and use in an application
for government registration of information about the results of preclinical
investigations and clinical trials of pharmaceutical products submitted by an
applicant for government registration of such products during the course of
six years from the date of government registration of the pharmaceutical
product.138 An explanatory note to the law indicated that the requirement
was directed at the development of the domestic pharmaceutical industry
and increasing the level of innovation.139
The language in Article 18.6 of the 2010 law raised several issues. First, it
was not clear from the language whether data exclusivity extended to the
first registered product, and second, it was unclear whether the producers of
generics could file applications for registration of their products during the
period of data exclusivity.140 In other words, the language of the law in 2010
failed to clarify whether the six-year period was for marketing exclusivity or
registration exclusivity.141

On January 1, 2016, amendments to Article 18 of the Law on Circulation
of Medicines went into effect.142 Under the amended law, which was
purportedly enacted to bring Russian legislation into compliance with
TRIPS, regulatory data protection is expressly extended to data about the
reference medicine, where a reference medicine is defined as "a medicine
which previously has never been registered in Russia, whose quality, efficacy
and safety have been confirmed by the results of preclinical and clinical trials
and which is used for the assessment of bioequivalence or therapeutic
equivalence, quality, efficacy and safety of a generic (or biosimilar)
medicine." 14
The January 2016 amendments to Article 18, however, undermine the
scope of regulatory data protection by allowing a registration application for
a generic or biosimilar to be filed upon the expiration of only four years
following the marketing authorization for a reference small molecule drug
137. Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Circulations of Medicine, 2010, No. 61-FZ.
138. Id. at art. 18.6.
139. Zakonoproyekt ? 426962-5:0 vnesenii izmeneniy v Federal'nyy zakon "Ob obrashchenii
lekarstvennykh sredstv" [Bill No. 426962-5: On Amending the Federal Law "On the Circulation of
Medicines"], GOSUDARSTVENNAYA DUMA FEDERAL'NOGO SOBRANIYA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII
[THE STATE DUMA OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE RussL
FEDERATION], http://asozd2

.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/(Spravka)?OpenAgent&RN=426962-5
(last visited Oct. 29, 2017)
(containing the explanatory record).
140. Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Circulations of Medicine, supra note 65, at art.
18.6.
141. Id.
142. Lisa L. Mueller, Current State of Data Protection and Exclusivity in Russia, THE NATIONAL
LAw REVIEW (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/current-state-data-protec
tion-and-exclusivity-russia.
143. Id.
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and three years after marketing authorization of a reference biologic
medicine.144 The 2016 amendments separate the six-year period of data
exclusivity into "registration exclusivity" (commonly known as "data
exclusivity") and "marketing exclusivity."145
As such, the amended Russian law provides four years of registration
exclusivity plus two years of marketing exclusivity for generic drugs and
three years of registration exclusivity plus three years of marketing
exclusivity for biosimilars.146 During the period of "registration" or "data
exclusivity," the Ministry of Health will not examine an application for
registration of a generic product pursuant to the abbreviated procedure.147
During the remaining period of "marketing exclusivity"-two years for
generics and three years for biosimilars-the Ministry of Health may
examine an application, but may not register the product prior to expiration
of the marketing exclusivity.148
Although the new law extends the protection of data exclusivity to the
prior registered reference drug, the law now extends only to the
unauthorized "commercial use" of such data.149 References to the
unauthorized "receipt," "disclosure," and "use in an applicationfor government

registration" of such data are absent from the amended language.150 The new
law prohibits only the unauthorized commercial use of the results of
preclinical investigations and clinical trials of pharmaceutical products
submitted by an applicant for government registration of such products
during the course of six years from the date of government registration of
the medicinal preparation.151
XI.

Novartis AG v. Biolntegrator

In 2014, the Swiss company Novartis Pharma AG brought an action
against the Russian company Biolntegrator.152 Having developed an
innovative drug named Fingolimod for the treatment of diffuse sclerosis,
marketed under the brand name Gilenya, Novartis registered the drug with
the Russian Ministry of Health.153 Biolntegrator, before the period of
exclusivity for Gilenya expired, filed an application to register a generic
144. Vladimir Sokov, et al., Amendments to the Law on Circulation ofMedicines, TERRALEX (Mar.
16, 2015), https://terralex.org/publication/pf578a7dOa/amendments-to-the-law-oncirculation-of-medicines.
145. Mueller, supra note 66.
146. Id.; see Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Circulations of Medicine, supra note 65,
at art. 18.
147. See Mueller, supra note 66.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
15 1. Id.
152. Novartis AG v. BioIntegrator, Verhovnyi Sud Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Verkh. Sud RF]
[Russian Federation Supreme Court] 2016, No. A40-188378/2014).
153. See id.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
192

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 51, NO. 2

equivalent of Fingolimod, marketed under the name Neskler, pursuant to
the abbreviated procedure for generic and biosimilar drugs.'54 Novartis then
brought a court action seeking a declaration that Biolntegrator's application
for approval of its generic drug was invalid, and an order prohibiting the
Ministry of Health and Biolntegrator from using the results of Novartis's
preclinical investigations and clinical trials for its product.155
The Moscow Arbitration Court, in a decision dated March 20, 2015,
sidestepped a discussion of data exclusivity per se and focused, instead, on
the time when the defendant filed its application.156 The court held that data
exclusivity protection did not apply because the application for registration
of the generic was filed prior to August 22, 2012, the date when Russia
became a member of the WTO.157
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Arbitration Court of Appeals by Novartis,
the appellate court rejected the decision of the lower court in a decision
dated August 14, 2015, finding that the original application for registration
of the generic drug, although filed prior to the effective date of the law, was
filed by a different legal entity, ZAO "Research Institute of Chemical
Diversity," and that the law did not allow for the assignment of the right to
file an application for registration of a pharmaceutical product from one
entity to another.158 In the opinion of the appellate court, affirmed by the
court of cassation, the application of Biolntegrator, having been filed after
the effective date of the law, was independent from the earlier application
filed by the Research Institute, and, accordingly, was subject to the
provisions on data exclusivity.159
In granting Novartis's petition, the appellate court analyzed the scope of
information protected by data exclusivity. The court held that exclusivity
"extends to any information about the applicant's conduct of preclinical
investigations and clinical trials involved in the application for government
registration of the product regardless of whether it was published or not."160
Biolntegrator then appealed to the Intellectual Property Court of the
Russian Federation (IPC).161
The IPC, in a decision dated December 17, 2015, reversed the appellate
courts and reinstated the decision of the Moscow Arbitration Court, holding
that "the prohibition set forth by Part 6, Article 18 of the Law 'On the
Circulation of Medicines' does not apply to information published in
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Novartis AG v. Biolntegrator, Verhovnyi Sud Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Verkh. Sud RF]
[Russian Federation Supreme Court] 2016, No. A40-188378/2014).
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. IP Court Interpreted Some Aspects of Data Exclusivity, LIDINGS (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www
.1idings.com/eng/legalupdates2?id=257.
161. See Mueller, supra note 66.
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specialized printed journals."162 The IPC rejected Novartis's suit on the
grounds that the data about the effectiveness of the generic product
submitted by Biolntegrator to the Ministry of Health was based on
information that had previously been published in scientific journals
describing the results of clinical trials in connection with Gilenya.163 The
IPC held that the Russian data exclusivity statute protects only undisclosed
data, and that as soon as information is published, it may be freely used for
the registration of generics.164
The IPC's decision in Novartis is problematic because it allows a generic

producer to rely indirectly on the innovator's registration by referencing the
data reported in scientific journals about the product following its approval,
and thereby to seek marketing approval for its own follow-on product during
the period of regulatory data protection. The Novartis decision is in conflict
with the Russian Law on Circulation of Medicines and TRIPS, and, further,
is conducive to bad faith conduct by producers of generic drugs. First,
Article 18.6 of the law prohibits the use of any information developed at
considerable effort in relation to preclinical investigations and clinical trials
submitted in an application for registration of a pharmaceutical product.
That is, the law refers not to the use of specific documents in the application
package but expressly extends to all information used in the government
registration.165

Second, publishing the results of investigations and trials is universal in
the pharmaceutical industry. The unconditional publication of such
information ensures the openness, transparency, and accountability of such
results and provides doctors and patients with maximum access to
information about pharmaceutical products. Following the interpretation of
the IPC to its conclusion would require a finding that Article 18.6 of the law,
at the moment of its enactment, failed to extend any protection whatsoever
inasmuch as all of the information about the investigative results, which
previously had to be submitted as part of the application for registration of
the original product, was already published and would not be subject to
protection.

Despite decisions from the lower courts holding the Russian Ministry of
Health to WVTO standards in its interpretation of regulatory data protection
requirements,166 the decision of the IPC in Novartis is a harmful precedent to
innovative drug developers and generic manufacturers alike. Concerns
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. IP Court Interpreted Some Aspects of Data Exclusivity, LIDINGS (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www
.1idings.com/eng/legalupdates2?id=257.
166. In the recent Trakten case, for example, a Russian generic producer named Farmasintez
filed an application with the Ministry of Health for registration of Trakten, a generic version of
Atripla, an innovative drug for the treatment of HIV registered by Gilead Sciences
International, Ltd. The Ministry of Health rejected the application on the grounds that it
covered a reference drug and was impermissibly filed prior to expiration of the four-year period
of data exclusivity. The Ministry's decision was affirmed on March 31, 2017 by the Arbitration
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stemming from the decision are amplified by statutory amendments to the
Law on Circulation of Medicines, proposed in October 2016 by the Russian
Ministry of Health that would codify the ruling in Novartis.
XII.

Conclusion

The enactment of regulatory data protection by the Russian Federation in
2012 was a positive step towards fulfilling Russia's obligations under Article
39.3 of TRIPS, promising a supportive environment for pharmaceutical
products in Russia. But the Novartis decision, the 2016 amendment to the
Law on Circulation of Medicines, and the pending legislative proposal to
codify the Novartis decision call that commitment into question, as they
significantly curtail the statutory protection of data exclusivity that is
essential to the development of the Russian pharmaceutical industry.
Without sufficient regulatory data protection, producers of generic drugs,
after government approval of an innovative drug, can immediately market a
generic copy of the innovative drug and deprive the innovator of the
opportunity to recoup its investment in development, investigation, and
registration of the drug.
Such are the realities governing decisions of foreign companies and
Russian producers regarding the marketing of innovative pharmaceutical
products in Russia. The Russian pharmaceutical market is potentially
attractive for foreign investors, witnessed by the fact that the majority of
foreign pharmaceutical companies have local manufacturing operations in
Russia in one form or another. The current insufficiency of regulatory data
protection resulting from the IPC's interpretation in Novartis could
discourage Russian domestic pharmaceutical companies from investment in
the development and investigation of innovative pharmaceutical
preparations, damage Russia's localization efforts, and drive away foreign
investors.

Court of Moscow, and again by the 9th Arbitrage Court of Appeal on June 16, 2017. See Case
No. A40-657/2017-121-10.re.
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